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Between Choice and Sacrifice: Constructions of 
Community Consent in Reactive Air Pollution 
Regulation 
Noga Morag Levine 
The author examines the images of community that lie behind the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's decision not to extend proactive, uniform regu-
lation of the Clean Air Act to the problem of local industrial odor. Under this 
decision, the regulation of such odors remains dependent on complaints and 
local initiatives rather than on proactive governmental intervention. The legiti-
macy and economic logic of the reactive structures the agency endorsed rely on 
two assumptions: (I) industrial odors are an aesthetic annoyance rather than a 
toxic threat; and (2) local environmental conditions reflect conscious decision-
making by homogenous local communities as to trade-offs. and preferences for 
environmental quality will differ among these communities. The author uses 
three case studies to cast doubt on the validity of these assumptions; they 
demonstrate in particular the mythical character of the "communityn posited 
by the EPA as a foundation for viable reactive enforcement. Indeed, to trigger 
enforcement, it has been necessary to undertake heroic organizational efforts 
and to create novel forms of social groupings hardly characterizable as "com-
munities." 
1035 
Le 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) was a central element in a 
wide ranging statutory "rights revolution" (Sunstein 1990) di-
rected at the vestiges of common law ordering that had survived 
the New Deal, particularly in the areas of environmental, health 
and safety, and consumer policy. Unlike the common law regime 
it sought to replace, the CAA advanced a proactive and uniform 
vision of air quality regulation and substituted national criteria 
for local community standards. The vast regulatory program im-
plemented under the CAA resulted in reductions in the level of 
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some prevalent pollutants, most notably lead, particulates, and 
carbon monoxide (Bryner 1993). But it has had significantly less 
success in the control of local concentrations of potentially toxic 
air contaminants (e.g., Graham 1985; Dwyer 1990; Robertson & 
Vanderver 1992). For those who breathe and smell such localized 
industrial fumes, regulatory interventions continue to· depend 
predominantly on effective mobilization of common 
law-inspired administrative mandates. Under these structures, 
enforcement is reactive, burdens of proof are carried by com-
plainants and plaintiffs, and judicial and administrative responses 
are driven by a search for violation of pertinent community air 
quality norms. 
In this article I examine the reasons why the regulation of 
localized air pollution continues to be both reactive and subject 
to decentralized standard setting and decision making. The com-
paratively deferential regulation of localized emissions, as con-
trasted with the proactive regulation of a few common pollutants, 
reflects underlying assumptions about the nature of the harm im-
posed by sources of local pollution and the character of the com-
munities surrounding them. The neutral regulatory stance of re-
active air pollution regimes is justified by defining as aesthetic 
those interferences caused by localized emissions. The presum~ 
tion that local air pollution derives from voluntary trade-offs be-
tween economic and environmental values and is thus unlikely to 
result in frequent protest is central to the logic of reactive air 
pollution structures. Where health concerns and multiple com-
plaints nonetheless materialize, agencies face contradictions 
grounded in competing commitments to both responsive govern-
ment and the status quo. 
I argue that reactive air pollution structures strive to avoid 
this dilemma by distinguishing the sentiments underlying pollu-
tion grievances from those presumably shared by relevant com-
munities. These communities, however, are hypothetical con-
structs with little relationship to the actual values and choices of 
pollution-affected locales. Through analysis of three local air pol-
lution disputes, I demonstrate that contrary to aesthetic formula-
tions of the problem, local pollution is perceived as a toxic 
threat. Further, in opposition to presumptions of reciprocity, in-
dustry'S neighbors often see themselves as uncompensated vic-
tims. In my concluding section, I suggest that discrepancies be-
tween the images guiding reactive air pollution regulation and 
the actual choices local communities increasingly articulate 
threaten to undermine both the rationale and the legitimacy of 
reactive environmental regimes. 
In response to long-present pressures for the control of in-
dustrial odors, Congress included in section 403 of the 1977 
Clean Air Act Amendments a specific directive requiring the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) to evaluate options for na-
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tional regulation of odor pollution. The EPA responded to this 
mandate in a 1980 report that explicitly rejected proactive fed-
eral odor control measures. The decision was justified both by 
the insensitivity of uniform standards to variations in "community 
sensibilities and preferences" (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 1980:59) and the utilitarian benefits that common law 
nuisance actions offer in this context. In accordance with the ra-
tionale of voluntary intercommunity air quality diversity, odor 
regulation has since remained the sole province of state, re-
gional, and local government. Disputes triggered by the aesthetic 
affront and toxicological worry industrial odors cause are com-
mon throughout the country (Shusterman 1992). They involve a 
range of facilities, including chemical and plastic manufacturers, 
foundries, pulp mills, refineries, sewage treatment plants, and ag-
ricultural operations (e.g., Barger 1993; Hubert 1993; Laxson 
1993; Lee 1993; Manning 1993; Boatwright 1992; Rollenhagen 
1994). 
The EPA report did not offer an explanation, beyond the 
subjectivity of olfactory tastes, for its presumption of variation "in 
community tolerances or odor annoyance levels" (U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency 1980:5). But the expectation that 
many communities would fail to mobilize against industrial pollu-
tion was central to the economic logic of the reactive odor poli-
cies the EPA endorsed. The industrial and administrative cost 
savings the EPA associated with common law-based pollution 
regulation would quickly disappear under conditions offrequent 
and effective demands for odor relief. Nuisance-based pollution 
interventions can introduce significant uncertainty into the regu-
latory expectations of industrial actors. They require expensive 
retrofitting, more easily and cheaply done in initial construction, 
and can trigger significant economic disruptions by imposing on 
some firms abatement costs their competitors avoid. Moreover, 
the evidentiary burdens that nuisance structures impose on 
plaintiffs are likely to consume significant administrative re-
sources where air pollution enforcement demands are frequent. 
In making the decision to reject proactive odor pollution 
control, the EPA had before it distinct evidence pointing to cor-
relations between sociodemographic status and the voicing of 
pollution and other environmental complaints (Copley Interna-
tional Corporation ("CIC") 1970; Lindvall & Radford 1973; Na-
tional Research Council 1979). There appeared to be significant 
basis for the expectation that local mobilization would fail to ma-
terialize in many odor-affected locales. Nevertheless, the effi-
ciency gains the EPA expected from nuisance regulation were 
not solely a function of presumptions of quiescence. As indicated 
before, the EPA report was itself the product of persistent public 
concerns and political pressures for odor interventions. The EPA 
thus had every reason to anticipate frequent odor complaints 
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and widespread demands for expensive post hoc controls. IT the 
EPA nevertheless expected reactive odor regulation to yield eco-
nomic benefits, it was because it assumed that such local mobili-
zation and complaints will only rarely result in abatement meas-
ures. This expectation was explicitly acknowledged by the 1980 
EPA report in a footnote that all but conceded the futility of 
most nuisance claims: 
Under the most widely recognized view, an odor problem must 
cause substantial annoyance to qualify as a nuisance. Unusually 
sensitive individuals are at a distinct disadvantage since annoy-
ance is judged on the basis of the ordinary person living in that 
locality. Technical legal defenses and burdensome evidentiary 
problems also detract from the usefulness of nuisance actions 
and in most cases courts will not issue prohibitory injunctions 
even if the plaintiff prevails on the merits of his claim. (P. 14 
n.*) 
The relationship between social structure, choice, and power 
in local community life has long been a subject of intense debate 
in American political theory. Much of this debate has centered 
on the effectiveness of transformations between social problems 
and local political demands. Whereas adherents of pluralist theo-
ries have usually argued in support of the capacity of diverse 
groups and objectives to influence patte·rns of local political ac-
tion (Dahl 1961), their opponents have disputed this assessment 
along three central lines Of argument. The first, primarily aSsoci-
ated with Olson (1971), cites collective action impediments to 
the organization of interests. The second; initiaily c:tdvariced by 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962), focuses on the place of issue sup-
pression in understandings of political power. I The third argues 
that political wants may themselves be the product of covert con-
trols influencing conceptions of alternatives and constricting the 
range of choices considered (Lukes 1974). 
Sociolegal scholars have followed a parallel line of inquiry in 
empirical investigations of a variety of reactive enforcement and 
allocation structures and have likewise questioned the fit be-
tween problems and complaints. While some observers see com-
plaints as a "tip of an iceberg" of a universe of unarticulated and 
unremediated injuries (Best & Andreasen 1977:701; Nader & 
Shugart 1980), others warn against enforcement distortions 
caused by "trivial claims" (Bardach & Kagan 1982:166). Differ-
ences in organizational structures appear to play a determining 
I In answer to the call for empirical consideration of nonissues, Crenson (1971) 
investigated variations in air quality policies within similarly polluted locales and attrib-
uted some of the differences he observed to the impact. of industrial influence on the 
suppression of pollution abatement demands. Pluralists such as Polsby (1980:216-17) an-
swered this line of criticism by suggesting that preferences, rather than power, may be at 
the root of local environmental differences and by positing the possibility of communities 
united both in their pursuit of economic benefits and in their consent to environmental 
burdens. . 
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role both in the frequency of complaints and the rigorousness of 
complaint-triggered enforcement (Kagan 1994). Where com-
plainants are organized through, for example, labor unions 
(Bardach & Kagan 1982; Scholz & Wei 1986) or trade associa-
tions (Hawkins 1984), they can have important impact on the 
enforcement priorities of an agency. But where such organiza-
tional support is missing, researchers have pointed to the silenc-
ing impact of soci<H:ognitive obstacles to problem perception 
(Felstiner et al. 1980-81), internalized expectations of defeat 
(Bumiller 1988), entrenched anti-voicing norms (Best & An-
dreasen 1977), and negative incentives grounded in inaccessible, 
complex, or even hostile response mechanisms (Nader 1980a; 
Crowe 1978). Much of this work has thus lent support to May-
hew's (1968) early observation, in the context of citizen-initiated 
antidiscrimination policy, of the myriad ways in which reactive 
law supports and reinforces the status quo. 
The central concern of both these political-theoretic and 
sociolegal debates has been with the conditions under which 
political and legal challenges to existing distributions do or do 
not materialize. In contrast, my focus here is on the ways in 
which redistributive demands, once voiced, are reconciled with 
continuing allegiance to the status quo. In particular, this study is 
concerned with the place of legal and institutional conceptions 
of communities and the norms they share in the marginalization 
of complainants who dispute the fairness of existing allocations. 
Air pollution complaints inevitably challenge presumptions 
of local environmental tolerance and pit the health and welfare 
concerns of complainants against the economic interests of in-
dustrial plants and their dependents. I argue in this article that 
in the implementation of such balancing processes, courts and 
agencies have resorted to artificial constructions of community 
tolerance despite evidence of local protest. Similar institutional 
constructions of community-for a variety of purposes-have 
been observed in both judicial (Yngvesson 1993) and administra-
tive contexts (Reiss 1971; Klockars 1991; Crank 1994). In a study 
of early efforts at implementing community-based policing, Reiss 
(1971:209) described calls for local control of central bureaucra-
cies as based on "false assumptions" about population stability 
and homogeneity. Others viewed such suppositions of moral co-
hesion less as a mistake than as a legitimating myth (Klockars 
1991) serving institutional functions (Crank 1994). I extend this 
functional perspective to the role of community conceptions in 
air pollution nuisance regulation and maintain that metaphors 
of tight-knit industrial communities serve to legitimate regulatory 
inaction in the face of local air pollution disputes. Invocations of 
community choice are used· within such conflicts as· an escape 
from the moral and political conundrums of imposed sacrifice, 
because they present outcomes as based in consent rather than 
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coercion. Yet because aversions to direct trade-offs between risks 
to human life and economic benefits are deeply entrenched 
(Schroeder 1986), the legitimacy of community choice solutions 
depends, in turn, on a fiction of safe air and definitions of indus-
trial odors as aesthetic annoyances. 
Because they challenge presumptions of community toler-
ance, citizen nuisance suits and pollution complaints confront 
courts and administrative agencies with hard enforcement 
choices. Under common law adjudication, this dilemma was 
often deflected through doctrines of reasonableness, implied 
consent, and differential thresholds for nuisance in industrial 10-
cales (Bone 1986). Current responses to air pollution nuisance 
disputes are, however, more often administrative rather than ju-
dicial. Case studies of the history of three similar foundry pollu-
tion disputes reveal differences between the responses offered by 
courts and agencies to the dilemmas of reactive air pollution con-
trol. The case studies illustrate the centrality of administrative 
tactics designed to avoid explicit balancing or impositions of loss 
through rituals of complaint handling and strategies of delay. 
Some citizen groups manage, through a combination of skills, 
connections, and tenacity, to trigger nuisance interventions 
under such frameworks. But where, the collective action barriers 
cannot be scaled, administrative inaction in the face of local pol-
lution concentrations 'is justified through arbitrary presumptions 
of community choice. 
Section I describes the reactive precepts of air pollution regu-
lation under the old regulatory regime, the transformations envi-
sioned by the federal CAA, and the continuing place of common 
law ordering under current air pollution policy. Section II out-
lines the background and assumptions behind the EPA's reactive 
policy decision. Sections III-VI follow the implementation of this 
policy in the context of judicial and administrative responses to 
three foundry odor nuisance disputes. The study concludes by 
linking the dilemmas of odor enforcement to the larger chal-
lenges raised by the environmental justice movement and the 
NIMBY syndrome2 regarding the equity and efficiency of commu-
nity-based environmental allocations. 
I. From the Common Law to the Clean Air Act and Back 
The history of air pollution policy in the United States prior 
to the 1970s has been characterized in the following tenus: 
[E]vents not foresight, ushered in each stage of intervention. 
Intervention tended to consist in curative rather than preven-
tive measures, and was designed to preserve so far as possible 
2 The acronym NIMBY stands for "Not In My Back Yard." It has been used in refer-
ence to the growing resistance of local communities to unwanted land uses and facilities, 
ranging from toxic waste sites to prisons (Brion 1991). 
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the prevailing social patterns-whether of business practice, 
citizen behavior, or the distribution of authority among local, 
state, and federal governments. (Krier & Ursin 1977:11) 
The placement of "burdens of inertia and uncertainty" on "those 
who sought change in the status quo" was central to the workings 
of this reactive regime (ibid.). 
The primary framework for the adjudication of disputes trig-
gered by the smoke, soot, and odors of industrial emissions was 
private nuisance tort doctrines prohibiting unreasonable inter-
ferences with the enjoyment of property (Juergensmeyer 1967; 
Laitos 1975). Because of the entanglement of property enjoy-
ment protections with competing rights to gainful use of prop-
erty, applicable doctrines have long been marked by strains be-
tween the rights of plaintiffs and defendants and between 
corrective justice and utilitarian principles (Epstein 1979; Bone 
1986; Rodgers 1986; Lewin 1990). These tensions were particu-
larly pronounced where individual litigants sought injunctive re-
lief from the pollution created by large industrial processes. 
These requests were often refused. But judges differed funda-
mentally in the doctrinal approaches they employed at suchjunc-
tures. Under one approach injunctive relief was denied, despite 
recognition of injury, through "balance of equities" tests and ex-
plicit understandings of pollution as an evil justified by a greater 
good. In contrast, other courts avoided the explicit sacrifice in-
herent to such balancing through reasonableness standards and 
numerous doctrinal mechanisms aimed at distinguishing sensitiv-
ities implicitly· underlying nuisance claims from relevant local 
standards (Kurtz 1976; Ellickson 1973; Bone 1986; Lewin 1990). 
In addition to private nuisance, the common law has long 
addressed air pollution concerns under the general category of 
public nuisance torts. A public nuisance is "any unreasonable in-
terference with rights common to all members of community in 
general and encompasses public morals, health, safety, peace, or 
convenience" (Black .1990:1230). Public nuisance structures 
straddle the boundaries between private and public law. They 
protect collective interests but follow a reactive logic. Interven-
tions depend on proof of annoyance or damage, and complaints 
serve important evidentiary and legitimating functions. The hy-
brid nature of public nuisance facilitated transitions into proac-
tive approaches to pollution control. But in the absence of clear 
evidence linking pollution with disease, the burdens of proof 
that public nuisance, like its private counterpart, imposed on 
plaintiffs and complainants undermined many antipollution ini-
tiatives (Pollack 1968; Jones 1975; Grinder 1980). 
Antismoke campaigns were undertaken, with some success, 
by several cities during the first half of the 20th century (Jones 
1975). But these improvements were largely the product of tech-
nological breakthroughs and the substitution of cleaner energy 
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sources for bituminous coal rather than active antipollution en-
forcement (Grinder 1980). Regulatory interventions were mostly 
complaint- and crisis-driven, and courts served as "chief allo-
cators" under "a pronounced bias in favor of localism" (Krier & 
Ursin 1977:48). A series of catastrophic air pollution episodes 
during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, coupled with progress in sci-
entific understandings of air pollution hazards, finally trans-
formed problem definitions and governing paradigms in this 
area Gones 1975; Krier & Ursin 1977). Federal regulation began 
with a series of incremental legislative steps enacted between 
1955 and 1967. But it was only with the 1970 Clean Air Act(CAA) 
that federal air pollution controls were unambiguously asserted 
and a new regulatory model emerged. 
Although the 1970 CAA did not explicitly articulate a right to 
clean air, its logic and mission were strongly suggestive of such a 
right. In a move analogous to constitutional rejections of individ-
ual and community autonomy in matters of civil rights, the CAA 
advanced a national, rather than a local, vision of acceptable air 
quality. Its regulatory ideal was one of proactive, uniform en-
forcement, and its promise was of safe air to all, irrespective of 
personal sensitivities, place of residence, or cost (Schroeder 
1983). 
Scientific optimism and trust in the capacity of unambiguous 
regulatory incentives to induce technological alternatives to mas-
sive environmental and economic losses partially account for the 
absolutist tenor of the CAA (La Pierre 1977; Krier & Gillette 
1985). But hopes for such innovation were contingent on credi-
ble threats of plant closure and willingness to incur the political 
costs associated with such measures. The hard choices implicit to 
technology forcing were, however, delegated to the newly cre-
ated and politically weak EPA (Schoenbrod 1983; Yale Law Jour-
nal 1979). And it was there that the CAA's multiple opportunities 
for silent balancing (Schoenbrod 1983:750) rather than its "as-
pirational" (Henderson & Pearson 1978) pronouncements deter-
mined the limits of federal air pollution enforcement. The result 
was a system of de facto compromises and delays framed by a 
"policy fiction" of unbending controls and equal air quality goals 
(Eads 1985:229). 
As indicated before, the EPA has had considerable success in 
the reduction of certain prevalent pollutants.3 But the regulatory 
3 The bulk of the EPA's air pollution control efforts have centered on regional at-
taintment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) governing six prevalent. 
multiple-source pollutants. The six original criteria pollutants were particulates. sulfur 
dioxide. carbon monoxide. ozone. nitrogen oxide. and hydrocarbons. The EPA added 
lead to the list in 1977. The hydrocarbon standard was deleted in 1978 as unnecessary. 
because hydrocarbons are a major component of ozone and are regulated under that 
standard (Reitze 1991). Emission .trends recorded by the EPA over the past two decades 
reveal significant reduction in levels of lead, carbon monoxide and particulates. Emis-
sions of volatile organic compounds (VOCS) have shown little decline throughout the 
1980s (Bryner 1993). 
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program it implemented paid little attention to intraregional var-
iations in local air quality and offered limited protection for the 
often poor and minority populations living in the vicinity of un-
controlled sources of hazardous emissions (Lazarus 1993). Un-
der section 112 of the 1970 CAA, particularly hazardous air con-
taminants were to be subject to emission standards allowing for 
"ample margins of safety." But the attempt, despite doubts re-
garding the existence of safe pollution exposure thresholds, to 
"outlaw death from air pollution" (Schoenbrod 1983:747) ulti-
mately became a formula for regulatory paralysis (Graham 1985; 
Goldberg 1988; Dwyer 1990; Robertson & VandeIVer 1992). Be-
tween 1970 and 1990 the EPA regulated only seven out of hun-
dreds of potentially toxic air contaminants. 4 
Recognition of this regulatory failure prompted a fundamen-
tal overhaul of federal hazardous air pollution mandates in the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Under the revised law, new 
and old m~or sources of 189 specified hazardous pollutants are 
to be subject to Maximum Achievable Control Technology stan-
dards (MAcr). Other mechanisms are to be applied to smaller-
area sources of toxic air contaminants and to some of the 
residual emissions remaining after the imposition of MAcr stan-
dards. Unlike its predecessor, the current federal air toxics con-
trol program does not promise to eliminate air pollution health 
risks (Chard 1991). But the more modest goals of the new pro-
gram justify hope for significant improvement in present levels of 
airborne toxics exposure.5 Although neighbors of currently un-
controlled sources of potentially hazardous pollutants are often 
unaware of pollution risks in their environment, when industrial 
pollutants can be detected as odorous fumes, concerns about 
toxicity often follow.6 As indiCated earlier, odors of this sort re-
main subject to common law nuisance, rather than to federal 
proactive regulation, under a rationale of diverse community 
trade-offs and sensibilities. The background to the EPA's deci-
sion in this context and the reasoning behind it are discussed in 
greater detail in ~e following section. 
4 They are arsenic, asbestos, benzene, beryllium, mercury, radionuclides and vinyl 
chloride (Robertson & Vanderver 1992:201). 
5 In recent congressional testimony a senior EPA official conceded the inadequacy 
of current air quality controls and stated: "Far too many people are exposed to air toxies 
from large and small stationery sources." Prepared Statement of Mary Nichols, Assistant 
Administrator for Air & Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, before Sub-
committee on Oversight of Government Management, Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs, U.S. Senate, in Federal Document Clearing House, 25 July 1994. 
6 The presence of odorous emissions per se does not constitute evidence of expo-
sure to air toxies. Numerous potent odorants can be detected at levels far lower than their 
known toxicological thresholds. Others are not associated with any long-term risks, and 
some air contaminants, such as carbon monoxide, are both odorless and hazardous. 
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II. Dilemmas and Options in the Control of Odors 
Growing public attention to air pollution problems during 
the postwar era brought new pressures for abatement of previ-
ously uncontrolled gaseous emissions and the odors they caused. 
During the 1950s odors were the target of regulatory programs 
initiated by a n~ber of local and state air pollution agencies 
(Edelen & Clark 1951; Gruber 1957; Stern 1957). During the 
1960s interstate odor disputes provided the occasion for some of 
the earliest federal air pollution control interventions under pro-
visions established in the 1963 Clean Air Act (Nelson 1967). Fol-
lowing the ep.actment of the 1967 Air Quality Act, the National 
Air Pollution Control Association engaged Copley International 
Corporation (CIC) to perform a comprehensive study directed at 
assessment of the prevalence of odor problems across the United 
States, the impact of o,dors on particular communities, and the 
state of regulatory enforcement (CIC 1970, 1971, 1973). The CIC 
study estimated that almost five. million American are signifi-
cantly bothered by odors. and pointed both to gaps between 
problem .perception and complaints and correlations between 
sociodemographic levels and air pollution awa~eness (CIC 1970: 
203-5). Public nuisance strucwres were identified, through a 
survey of regulatory enforcement practices, as the primary ad-
ministrative mandates in this area. InteIYiewsconducted with 
agency representatives in seven metropolitan areas did not reveal 
any instan~e in which odor pollution violators were subject to 
substantial fines or judicial penalties, The .CIC study'S conclusion 
regarding the state of regulatory action in this area was that "to 
date, the tools and devices available to enforcement agencies to 
deal with odor problems have been virtually nil" (ibid., p. 206). A 
model odor control ordinance developed in conjunction with 
the study proposed the use of public opinion surveys, rather than 
citizen complaints, in regulatory assessments of local odor 
problems (CIC 1973: 17). 
. The EPA did not adopt the model ordinance and failed to 
implement any other odor-directed measures 'under the 1970 
CAA. This failure, coupled with continuing public concern with 
odor pollution problems, resulted in the earlier mentioned con-
gressional directive to the EPA under the 1977 CAA. Two studies 
were written in compliance with this mandate. The first was com-
missioned by the EPA from the National Research Council (NRC 
1979). The second was the internal EPA report cited earlier in 
this article (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1980). The 
NRC study included a comprehensive analysis of health and wel-
fare effects of odor, available measurement and abatement tech-
nologit:s, and alternative regulatory approaches to the problem. 
The NRC report described a number of successful odor control 
techriologies but pointed to important economic impediments to 
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their implementation. Because of the low concentrations in 
which some odorants can be detected, the NRC report noted 
that "the only sure way to alleviate complaints of malodors down-
wind of a source is to preclude detection at all. . . . This usually 
requires control at the source with an efficiency of 95-100%, 
which is far greater than the efficiency needed for most gaseous 
emission" (NRC 1979: 179). 
The costs associated with comprehensive odor controls are 
crucial to an understanding of the EPA's subsequent rejection of 
uniform federal odor control policies. If set at levels sufficient to 
eliminate most industrial odors, uniform odor standards could 
dramatically increase pollution control expenditures in many in-
dustries. Cheaper and less comprehensive odor abatement man-
dates might provide incremental improvements in local air qual-
ity but would most likely fail to eliminate offensive odors and 
might stir discontent among residents faced with the knowledge 
that no further relief is in sight. By focusing on community an-
noyance rather than·odor detection, nuisance approaches bypass 
the dilemmas inherent to uniform odor controls. While they 
hold out the possibility of complete abatement, they spare most 
polluting firms major pollution control expenses by conditioning 
interventions on citizen proof of violated communal norms. 
The NRC report recommended against the establishment of 
federal ambient air quality or emission standards but did not ex-
plicitly justify this recommendation in economic efficiency terms. 
Instead the report's executive summary emphasized obstacles 
created by variability in olfactory sensitivity, and argued that "be-
cause reactions to odor depend heavily on local values and indi-
vidual aesthetic judgements,. national standard-setting ~ill be very 
difficult" (NRC 1979:7). Crucial to this recommendation and the 
aesthetic problem definition it invoked was the assumption that 
odorous emissions do not constitute a toxicological threat. In a 
section devoted to the public health aspects of odor pollution, 
the NRC study stated: "[T] oxic odoro~ substances in the atmos-
phere are automatically subject to standard-setting under the 
Clean Air Act of 1970 and its amendments, and reduction of 
their presence to below toxic thresholds is mandatory" (NRC 
1979:64). Little progress under the EPA's airtoxics control pro-
gram had taken place by .1979, but the problems encountered in 
this sphere were not acknowledged by the NRC report. 
The EPA's own report referred to th~ state of air toxics con-
trol only to reject the use of emission· standards under section 
112 of the CAA in the control of od~rs. The report stated: "To 
date, EPA has used Section 112 sparingly, reserving it for the reg-
ulation of extremely dangerous pollutants such as mercury, as-
bestos, beryllium and vinyl chloride. Given the present uncer-
tainty· regarding th'e public health effects of odors, it see~ quite 
doubtful that ·EPA ~ould promulgate a defensible hazardous 
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emission standard for the control of specific odorant or for odors 
generally" (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1980:19). The 
EPA never acknowledged a possible connection between olfac-
tory and toxicological concerns and adhered to strictly aesthetic 
problem"definition of odor intrusions.7 This fonnulation was cru-
cial both to the legitimacy and the outcome of the balancing op-
portunities the EPA attributed to nuisance structures: 
Despite "all of its substantive, procedural "and evidentiary short-
comings, the nuisance approach is the only odor-regulation 
strategy now in use that is tied directly to the basic criterion of 
an unreasonable interference with public or private rights. As 
in other"areas of nuisance law, odor nuisance disputes are re-
solved on" the basis of lay testimony concerning the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's behavior. The level of private or public 
annoyance is balanced against the defendant's interests in con-
tinuing to operate. Numerically based odor control approaches 
(ambient and source) lack this important feature. This is their 
basic shortcoming. (Ibid., pp. 14-15) 
The EPA never explained how such balancing pI"Ocesses are 
carried out or what impact community standards have on their 
implementation. But as suggested earlier, the expectation that 
complaints would only rarely yield interventions was central to 
the economic logic of the EPA's nuisance policy. The obstacles 
that common law judges have long placed before nuisance liti-
gants were explicitly acknowledged by the report (ibid., p. 14). 
So was the fact that "while most jurisdictions experience many 
odor problems, few rank them as one of their top agency priori-
ties" (p. 12). The EPA did not, however, link these judicial and 
administrative impediments to the utilitarian benefits it attrib-
uted to nuisance law. Neither did it address the tension between 
community choice rationales and the difficulties encountered by 
those who pursue nuisance claims. These tensions are at the 
heart of the regulatory regime endorsed by the EPA in the regu-
lation of odorous fumes. Their negotiation is the focus of the 
following analysis of judicial and administrative responses to pol-
lution disputes and complaints. 
III. Consent and Community in Common Law Nuisance 
Adjudication 
The common law's traditional deference to community stan-
dards and local choice has long played a pivotal role in blunting 
the coercive impact of the utilitarian calculus. Air pollution 
7 In 1992 the EPA issued a report specifying odor thresholds for hazardous air pol-
lutants listed in the 1990 CAA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1992). The repon 
acknowledged that under cenain circumstances odor perception may be indicative of 
toxicological risk. The EPA report was not, however. indicative of a shift in the EPA's 
decision not to regulate odors. Rather. the report was primarily directed at the state and 
local agencies that respond to the toxic exposure concerns triggered by odors. 
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plaintiffs invariably disputed presumptions of fit between local 
conditions and standards. In the face of such challenges, courts 
often used arguments directed at distinguishing governing envi-
ronmental standards from those suggested by nuisance plaintiffs. 
Nuisance thresholds in industrial neighb<?rhoods were differenti-
ated from those applicable to more bucolic locales; residence in 
polluted areas was constrUcted as implied consent and complain-
ants were cast as hyPersensitive and unrepresentative members of 
a local population presumably more tolerant of "trifling inconve-
niences" in its environment (Bone 1986). 
All these arguments were invoked in a 1935 Pennsylvania 
opinion responding to complaints against the "noxious effects of 
the smoke dust and odors" emanating from burning piles of 
mine waste (Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co. 1935). 
The court justified the losses suffered by the plaintiffs who lived 
in the vicinity of the mine in the following interpretation of the 
choices made by local residents: "inhabitants of this district were 
cognizant of the industrialization of the community when they 
moved into it. They voluntarily took up abode in this territory, 
and can scarcely with consistency now be heard to voice a protest 
about the smokey atmosphere. One who voluntarily goes to war 
should not complain· about cannon smoke" (p .. 384). The judge 
acknowledged the annoyance produced by the emissions and 
sympathized with "the violence which is done to the aesthetic 
unities of the community" (p. 394), but concluded that this an-
noyance is ,"trivial in comparison to. the positive harm· and dam-
age that would be done to the community, were the injunction 
asked for granted" (p. 383). 
Much closer in time to the EPA's rejection of proactive fed-
eral industrial odor controls was a decision issued by the Illinois 
Supreme Court (Wells Mfg. Co. v. PoUution Control Bd. 1978). The 
opinion sustained an appellate court decision reversing an order 
of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, which had found the op-
erators of an iron foundry guilty of releasing offensive odors, or-
dered the implementation of abatement measures, and imposed 
a $9,000 fine on the company. The plant in question, Wells Man-
ufacturing, was located in Skokie, Illinois, within an industrial 
district adjacent to a number of residential neighborhoods and a 
large high school. The plant was built in 1947 when the area 
around it was largely undeveloped. The odors attributed to the 
plant were the product of emissions produced in the casting pro-
cess when hot metal polymerizes resins used in the binding of 
sand and cereal molds. The· fumes created by this process con-
tain both formaldehyde and phenol and smell like burning rob-
ber. 
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Complaints and local organizational efforts directed at the 
smoke and odors emitted by Wells date to the mid-1960s.8 Since 
the late 1960s both local and state air pollution control agencies 
liave been involveq ip n~erous actions direc_ted at pollution 
cibatemenpn the plant. WhereaS problems related to particulate 
emissions were essentlally resolved by the early i 970s; concerns 
over the foundry's' odors and their potential health effects per-
sisted. In 1993 the Illinois Environmental Protectioq. Agency and 
the environmental group Citi?:ens for a Better Environmen~ filed 
a consolidated comp~aint before the Illinois Pollution Control 
Board alleging a violatiqn of sections 9(a) and 9'(b) of the state's 
Environmental Protection Act. Section 9(a) prohibits the emis-
sion of air contaminants which ".can cause or, tend to cause air 
pollution in Illinois." Section 9(b) codifies traditional common 
law nuisance doctrines by defining air pollution as "[t]he pres-
ence in the atmosphere of one or more contaminants in suffi-
cient quantities and of such characteristics and duration as to be 
injurious to human, plant, or ~nimal life, to health or to prop-
erty, or to unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or 
property." Under section 33 (c) of the act, in assessing the rea-
sonableness of air pollUtion emissions the Pollution Control 
Board is required to consider the character and degree of inter-
ference, the social and economic value of the pollution source, 
the suitability of the pollution source to its area, and the techni-
cal practicability and economic reasonableness of abatement. 
In response to this complaint the Illinois Pollution Control 
Board held extensive hearings. Twenty-two local residents, high 
school faculty members, and city officials testified to various ef-
fects of the odor on their lives, including nausea, burning eyes 
and throats, respiratory difficulties, and nagging fears about 
long-term toxicity. The board also heard from representatives of 
three firms engaged in the manufacture of technological devices 
directed at odor.control. They described a number of alternative 
solutions to the problem, including adsorption through activated 
carbon, chemical absorption, and oxidation of the gases via ex-
posure to ozone. Wells Manufacturing, for its part, introduced 
the testimony of an 'odor consultant who maintained that tests he 
conducted showed 60-90% reductions in odorous emissions fol-
lowing an adjustment in the composition of the resins used by 
the company (Wellf Mfg. Co. v. Pollution Control Bd. 1977:339). 
Wells also presented evidence relating to the social and eco-
nomic value of its plant and the hardships curtailment of its activ-
ity would produce. . 
The First District Appellate Court overturned the Pollution 
Control Board's decision because of insufficient consideration of 
relevant circumstances under section 33 (c) of the Environmen-
8 Resolution issued by the Motton Grove (IL) Board ofTrustees~ 28 Jan. 1974. 
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tal Protestation Act. The court characterized the interference 
caused by the odor as a "mild discomfort" (p. 339) and empha-
sized that "both the residents of the area and Niles West High 
School were well aware of the nature of the area when they 
moved in" (ibid.). Against these factors the Appellate Court em-
phasized Wells's significance as a "source of necessary industri~l 
parts and as an employer" (ibid.). Finally, the opinion character-
ized testimony regarding the availability of technical solutions to 
the problem as "self serving attempts" by "three competing sales-
men who had failed to sell their devices to Wells." The court con-
cluded: "It is clear from the record there is no working model 
anywhere in existence to completely control the odor from the 
foundry .... Unless and until a more efficient means of cutting 
the emissions from the plant is found, it is unreasonable to ex-
pect Wells to do more" (p. 340). 
In sustaining the appellate court decision, the Illinois 
Supreme Court offered the following formulation of the Pollu-
tion Control Board's duties in cases stich as this: "The Board 
must balance the costs and benefits of abatement in an effort to 
distinguish 'the trifling inconvenience, petty annoyance or minor 
discomfort' from 'a substantial interference with the enjoyment 
of life and property' " .( Wells Mfg. Co. v.' Pollution Control Rd. 1978: 
232, quoting Processing & Rooks, Inc. v. Pollution Control Rd. 
1976:77). The board's error, argued the Illinois Supreme Court, 
derived from the excessive weight accorded to the odor's local 
impact over competing considerations in the balancing process. 
The court agreed with the lower court's finding that "the resi-
dents and school were on notice of the possibility that some an-
noyances present in heavy-manufacturing areas could affect 
them, and this fact considerably diminishes the potency of their 
complaints" (p. 236). The court further argued that the burden 
of proving the reasonableness and practicability of abatement 
measures lies with the agency. This burden, the court concluded, 
has not been met because of differences between .the control so-
lutions advocated by each of the three experts whose testimony 
was presented. A later decision by the Illinois EPA and Pollution 
Control Board to reject Wells's permit renewal request because 
of its odorous emissions was overturned on appeal on technical 
grounds (Wells Mfg. Co. v. EPA 1990). 
In contrast to formal rationales of community choice, the de-
cisions in both Wells and Versailles placed little emphasis on the 
actual norms and sensibilities of the populations living in the vi-
cinity of industrial sources. The losses suffered by neighbors were 
diminished through trivialization of the harm suffered and justi-
fied through presumptions of consent. Against the backdrop of 
repeated testimony concerning health effects and toxicological 
worry, both courts adhered to aesthetic definitions of the prob-
lem of industrial odors. Similarly, neither the residential choices 
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available to mine workers during the 1930s nor the apparent ig-
norance of suburban homebuyers regarding the potential impact 
of uncontrolled industry was deemed relevant to governing as-
sumptions of consent. 
Not all nuisance decisions followed the pattern described 
above. Strains of anti-utilitarian, rights-based reasoning have long 
existed in the doctrines of some courts and jurisdictions (Rod-
gers 1986). The Wells decision itself included two strong dissent-
ing opinions. Nevertheless, as the EPA report has itself recog-
nized, prevailing patterns in air pollution adjudication accord 
with the majority's position in Wells. 
Public nuisance adjudication is unusual, however, in today's 
administrative 'environment. The EPA report noted this phenom-
enon and stated that the "vast m.yority of odor problems are re-
solved extrajudicially. Only in relatively rare cases of strong com-
munity pressure and stiff industry resistance do these matters 
require adjudicatory resolution" (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 1980: 13). The following case studies are directed at an 
examination of the mamier in which agencies have responded to 
the dilemmas of reactive air pollution regulation and the ways in 
which their solutions differ from those developed by judges in 
common law nuisance actions.9 Unlike the filing of lawsuits, 
which can only be executed with significant effort and expense, 
the voicing of air pollution complaints is relatively easy. Conse-
quently, air pollution control agencies, much more than courts, 
are likely to encounter frequent calls for intervention. Yet, per-
haps even to a greater extent than courts, agencies of this sort 
are ill prepared to undertake the redistributive tasks demanded 
by air pollution complainants. Unlike judges, air pollution ad-
ministrators must enforce the allocative decisions they make and 
are subject to direct and explicit political pressures. Moreover, 
although odor complaints are often the prime context in which 
the general public comes into contact with the agency, odor en-
forcement is marginal to the central statutory mission of these 
agencies under the federal CAA. Aggressive odor abatement 
measures could threaten more urgent administrative priorities by 
undermining an agency's relationship with regulated entities. On 
the other hand, failure to respond adequately to air pollution 
complaints is likely to result in negative publicity and unwanted 
political attention. The alternative is nondecision, something 
that agencies, unlike courts, may opt for. The extent to which 
this option has been pursued, and the role played by administra-
9 The case studies that follow are based on participant obseIVation derived from the 
author's experience as a regular complainant and participant in the group effortS sur-
rounding the Berkeley case, archival research in each agency investigated, interviews with 
agency personal and members of the local groups associated with each dispute, and a 
review of pertinent media accounts. 
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tive constructions of local choice in its implementation are at the 
center of the following sections. 
Whereas the texts of judicial opinions are the primary source 
for the study of adjudicative responses to environmental griev-
ances, evaluations of reactive administrative policies depend on 
detailed understandings of the regulatory processes that citizen 
pollution complaints trigger. I have explored the specific criteria 
agencies employ in definitions of relevant local standards and 
the nature of the responses air pollution complaints generate. 
The case studies I report here analyze the general odor enforce-
ment policies of two large air pollution control agencies and fol-
low the implementation of these policies in the context of two 
foundry emission disputes that are much like the Wells Manufac-
turing case. 
Foundries of this sort were recognized in the NRC (1979) 
report as sources of potentially significant odorous emissions, but 
in contrast to the position adopted by the Wells court in 1978, the 
NRC cited a number of potentially effective technological ap-
proaches to the control of foundry odors, among them incinera-
tion, catalytic combustion, and wet scrubbing (NRC 1979:317). 
At present, the installation of any such controls, under the reac-
tive regime retained by the EPA, is contingent on specific find-
ings of local odor violations. Uncontrolled sources of potentially 
toxic foundry emissions are currently among the processes 
targeted for abatement under the air toxics control measures of 
the 1990 CAA (Petriko 1993). The case studies suggest the cen-
trality of toxicity concerns in foundry odor disputes and contrast 
these concerns with the aesthetic annoyance problem definitions 
governing the responses of two local agencies. Despite important 
differences in ultimate outcome and agency approach, the evolu-
tion of the two disputes reflects fundamental tensions within re-
active air pollution regulation and points to the role that admin-
istrative constructions of community and choice serve in the 
deferment of redistributive measures. 
IV. Regulatory Definitions of Nuisance and Community 
Annoyance: Bay Area Air Quality Management 
District 
In its 1980 report the EPA singled the nuisance definitions 
employed by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District 
(BAAQMD) as "[p]robably, the most clearly drafted and well con-
ceived odor regulation in effect today" (pp. 40). The BAAQMD is 
the regional air pollution agency in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
It is the second largest air pollution agency in California and is 
broadly considered to be well staffed, professional, and effective. 
California's pollution laws are particularly strict, and environ-
mental awareness in the Bay Area is high. The BAAQMD annually 
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logs and investigates thousands of pollution complaints10 and 
considers complaint response to be an important agency priority. 
Nevertheless, citizens in odor-affected areas often express deep 
frustration with the agency's policies. The former chairperson of 
the BAAQMD'S independent quasijudicial hearing board echoed 
these sentiments at the conclusion of one odor nuisance hearing: 
There is a very large number of aspects of the District's ap-
proach to odor nuisance cases ... which I simply cannot under-
stand .... First, I do not understand ... why members of the 
public dealing with the agency, with respect to odor nuisance 
complaints, end up so frequently feeling that they, the mem-
bers of the public, somehow were at. fault in failing to figure 
out how to get the message through to the agency, which pre-
sumably is responsive to this kind of public problem .... The 
first of it is that there's an awful lot of what appears to me to be 
a serious lack of responsiveness and aggressiveness on the part 
of the District staff in these odor nuisance cases. I find it ex-
tremely frustrating, extremely disappointing, for an agency that 
in so many other respects is ~xpert and aggressive. ~ 1 
The reasons behind the regulatory puzzle hinted at by these 
comments are at the center of the following analysis. 
Air pollution nuisances are regulated in California under sec-
tion 41700 of the Health and Safety Code, which prohibits the 
release of air contaminants causing injury or nuisance to a con-
siderable number of people or the public. The BAAQMD has inter-
preted this man(late through two. evidentiary procedures.' The 
first, which can be triggered only when a source has been the 
subject of complaints by at least 10 individuals during a 90-day 
period, follows the assumption that odorous air pollution can 
cause a community annoyance when odorant concentrations in 
ambient air are at least four times greater than the minimum 
concentrations at which these odorants can be smelled. Under 
this premise, air samples collected from the vicinity of suspected 
odor sources are subjected to fourfold 'dilution and presented to 
a panel of three BAAQMD employees. A nuisance violation is estab-
lished if two of the three panelists detect the odor following its 
dilution (BAAQMD Regulation 7). Although the BAAQMD has suc-
cessfully relied on this method to substantiate violations caused 
by potent odorants such as pulp mill emissions (Shusterman 
1992), less intensive odors often cannot be verified after the spec-
ified dilutions. 
Most odor nuisance violation notices issued by the BAAQMD 
are the product of a second, exclusively complaint-based eviden-
10 The number of odor complaints received by the BAAQMD has been gradually 
increasing. Whereas in 1976 the district logged 2,307 complaints of which 65% were odor 
related (NRC 1979:474), in 1991 it recorded 7,270 pollution complaints of which 4,842 
pertained to odors (BAAQMD records). 
11 Comments at Conclusion of Hearing by Hearing Board Member Kenneth A. 
Manaster, Docket No. 2087, Apco v. Becton-DickinSon, 6 July 1989. 
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tiary criterion. Under this criterion, emissions from an industrial 
facility are considered a public nuisance when complaints from 
five separate households downwind are confirmed by the district 
within a 24-hour period (Chaset 1987). While on its face, this 
formula appears to offer a rather liberal interpretation of section 
41700's reference to a "considerable number of people," the con-
troversies surrounding the BAAQMO'S nuisance enforcement prac-
tices have largely been the product of the obstacles presented by 
this "rule of five." The BAAQMD op~rate~ a toll-free complaint hot 
line around the clock and investigates all the complaints it re-
ceives. The complaint telephone number is listed in all local 
phone books, and the district's complaint procedures are ex-
plained in its public se~ce publica,tions, but the BAAQMD does 
not solicit complaints or actively infqrm residents of polluted lo-
cales of its program. Complainants must discover the district on 
their own, often after fruitless calls to police, fire departmen~, or 
the local municipality. When an odor nuisance complaint comes 
in during regular working hours, an inspector is dispatched to 
the complainant's location. Mter-hours complaint investigations 
are initiated only when there are three or more complain~ 
against the same source. A complaint is confirmed when both 
inspector and complainant can together smell the odor and the 
inspector can trace the emissions to a particular source. Com-
plaint response time depends on staffing and the specific availa-
bility of inspectors. Although the BAAQMD aims for. a response 
time of 30-45 minutes (Chaset 1987), longer response times are 
common. 
Odors often come and go in unstable and unpredictable pat-
terns. Shifts in wind direction' and variations in industrial 
processes can make odorous emissions difficult to verify at any 
specific moment. If an inspector and the complainarit cannot to-
gether smell the odor, the complaint cannot be confirmed, even 
if the inspector has independently detected the odor. Complaint 
verification thus depends on the concurrence of the following 
factors: the continuation of the odor-causing process, stable me-
teorology, the presence of the complainant when the inspector 
arrives, and the inspector's ability to trace the odor to a source. 
Only when all of these coincide during the inspector's visit can a 
complaint be confirmed. Not ,surprisingly, most complaints are 
not confirmed. 
Some complainants react with 'embarrassment at their failure 
to confirm a complaint, particularly as inspectors may interrupt 
other duties and often drive consid~rable distance to investigate 
complaints. When they fail to confirm, complainants at times feel 
at fault and act apologetic. Others become hostile, blaming the 
inspector for his/her delay or for the district's general policies. 
Many, after a number of such failures, stop complaining. Those 
who persist become well acquainted With the inspectors who time 
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after time visit their house. Although such repeated encounters 
will in all likelihood yield confirmations, a confirmed complaint 
will only result in a nuisance violation if four or more additional 
complaints are confirmed on the same day.12 With one relatively 
minor modification,13 the BAAQMD staff has been unwilling to de-
part from this policy despite the significant enforcement and 
public relations costs it has exacted. 
The BAAQMD justifies its procedural nuisance requirements by 
the requisites of legal proof,14 a cautiousness well supported by 
the results in decisions such as Well5. Nevertheless, evidentiary 
constraints appear to provide an incomplete explanation for the 
policy choices made in this context. Demands for face-to-face 
confirmations ostensibly stem from the need to assure, under the 
logic of reactive enforcement, that smells detected by inspectors 
are indeed the ones responsible for complaints. Where multiple 
potential odor sources are present, questions about the specific 
identity of odors might arise. In most chronic odor nuisance situ-
ations, however, inspectors are amply familiar with the specific 
odors mentioned and described by complainants and gather lit-
de additional information from repeated personal interviews. 
Likewise, there appears to be litde evidentiary justification for 
the 24-hour cutoff. The district's definition does not allow for 
the consideration of cumulative complaints on aggregate annoy-
ances and defines nuisance disputes in discrete time-bound 
terms. Each day's complainants are distinguished from those of 
the day before, and each morning the counting begins anew. 
Neither section 47100 nor the doctrinal precepts of public nui-
sance dictate such an interpretation, and both appear compati-
ble, at least in principle, with methods and criteria that allow for 
history and context in the assessment of nuisance. , 
Public nuisance prosecutions "are, as a matter of fact, very 
rare in the BAAQMD, and citations are most often setded within 
the agency (Chaset 1987). It is thus the agency, not the courts, 
that in almost all cases direcdy faces' the dilemmas that have long 
shaped pollution nuisance a<ljudication, and it is in terms of 
12 While the BAAQMD does not issue a violation, notice in the absence of five con-
firmed complaints, it has been willing, under some circumstances, to bring before its 
hearing board requests for abatement of odors that did not produce violation notices. 
Repon regarding District Complaint Confirmation and Enforcement Policy Concerning 
Pacific Steel Casting Company, attachment B, 14June 1989. 
13 That modification relaxes the requirement for five fac~Urface confirmations 
under the following circumstances: the odor problem is ongoing, the complainant has 
previously been found "reliable," three face-to-face confirmations have already occurred 
on that day, ,and no more than an hour has passed between the registration of the com-
plaint and the inspector's visit. BAAQMD Odor Enforcement pamphlet. 
14 In response to criticisms of its policy, BAAQMD staff has argued: "We do not 
believe that we could reasonably expect a coun to award civil penalties for any given 
violation of Health and Safety Code Section 41700 unless the District staff were able to 
confirm and prove that on the day in question the offending odor affected such a 'consid-
erable number of persons.' " Repon Regarding District Complaint Confirmation, 14June 
1989. 
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these dilemmas that the "rule of five" can perhaps best be under-
stood. The primary significance of nuisance violations lies not in 
the fines they can trigger but in the community tolerance suppo-
sitions they debunk. Under the logic of reactive air pollution en-
forcement, the accumulation of nuisance citations provides a 
clear mandate for intervention. Common law judges evaded such 
thresholds through multiple doctrinal constructions of local stan-
dards and consent. The BAAQMD'S fourfold dilution and the re-
quirement of five confirmations in a day serve analogous sifting 
functions. Yet, unlike common law decisions such as Versailles or 
Wells, the BAAQMD does not openly justify nuisance distinctions by 
neighborhood characteristics, residential choice, or definitions 
of odor as a trivial aesthetic concern. The redistributive implica-
tions of its own policy are hidden behind collective action barri-
ers inherent to the conditions specified by its rule of five. Pros-
pects for multiple complaint confirmations rise sharply when 
neighbors alert one another to the presence of the odor and co-
ordinate complaints. As will be later shown, subsequent abate-
ment action likewise depends on concerted and prolonged local 
organizational efforts. Thus nuisance interventions by the 
BAAQMD tend to be allocated only to places where residents can 
support and sustain intensive mobilization efforts. 
Although community mobilization is often crucial to success-
ful negotiation of the five confirmations rule, its legitimacy 
within structures of reactive regulation is uncertain (Black 1973). 
In situations of ongoing odor disputes, local residents have, on 
numerous occasions, used'phone trees to encourage complaints 
and increase their temporal proximity, and the BAAQMD has 
knowingly issued violation notices based on phone-tree-gener-
ated complaints. One such phone tree was created in a neighbor-
hood adjacent to Pacific Steel Casting (PSC), a foundry located 
at the industrial edge of Berkeley, California. The foundry was 
accused of emitting odors like those created by the Wells facility. 
PSC challenged a violation notice issued after it confirmed that 
complaints were filed by neighbors who used a phone tree to 
alert others to the presence of the odor. The case came before a 
local municipal court where the violation notice was dismissed 
(Bay Area Air Quality Management Vist. v. Pacific Steel Castings Co. 
1991). In support of his decision, the judge cited both the ab-
sence of sufficient spontaneity in coordinated complaint mecha-
nisms and the nature' of the locale in question. The judge de-
scribed the impact of the phone tree in the following terms: 
The complaint process has been skewed by the arborial [sic] 
complainants. In order to validate the constitutionality of the 
statute authorizing these penalties, one must have confidence 
in the spontaneity and self generation of the complaints them-
selves. If it is not spontaneous and self-generating and of a na-
ture in and of itself to impel the "victim" to complain, it is prob-
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ably not a nuisance. A true "nuisance" must be presumed to be 
so offensive as to be recognizable as such by ordinary reason-
able people in substantially large portions of the community. 
(P.7) . ' . 
As to the relationship betWeen locale characteristics and polhI-
tion nui,sance thresholds, the judge argued: 
In this regard the ·nature of the surrounding area must be con-
sidered, for wh3:t is a nuisance in one area may not be a nui-
sance in another .... ~eople who move into an industrial area 
must adjust their sensibilities to the realities of commerce. 
They live there cheaper than elsewhere because of the area's 
shortcomings, and should not expect the refinements of ~e 
lakeside countryclub. It is clear that from the nature of the area 
in which the defendant's business is located, that the odors 
which it occasionally emits are not such as to constitute a public 
nuisance in that area. (Pp. 7-8) 
The BAAQMD did not appeal the decision. The foundry was in 
the midst of comprehensive odor reduction measures expected 
to resolve the long dispute, and an appeal would have cut into 
other administrative priorities. But perhaps more significantly. 
successful appeal of the case would have depended on the 
agency's willingness to indict both its nuisance definition policies 
and its actions in the decade-long dispute preceding the phone-
tree decision. 
v. Foundry Odors and Nuisance Regulation: Berkeley, 
California . 
Pacific Steel Casting melts and casts scrap metal in three ad-
joining facilities built in 1934,)975, and 1981. During the 1980s 
the company employed between 300 and 550 individuals.15 The 
foundry's immediate neighbors are an ink manufacturer, a ce-
ment company, and a tire repair shop, but the nearest residential 
neighbors are only a few blocks away. The factory's surroundings, 
a checkerboard of industrial buildings and older homes, has. 
been gradually transforming as new commercial developments 
moved in, and some of the factories shut down. About a half-mile 
east of PSC, across the main thoroughfare of San Pablo Avenue, 
are the middle-class residential neighborhoods of Berkeley and 
Albany. To the northeast is a large married-student housing com-
plex operated by the University of California. 
Odor complaints against PSC began to reach the BAAQMD in 
the mid-1970s16 and continued throughout the 1980s. Complain-
ants described the odor as "bakelite," "burning plastic," "metal-. 
15 Air PoUwion Control Officer V. PacifIC Steel Casting Co .• Accusation of Violation of 
California Health & Safety Code sec. 41700. and application for order for abatement, 
Docket No. 832. 22 March 1982. 
16 Case Summary. Pacific Steel Casting Co .• 25 Feb. 1982 (BAAQMD files). 
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lic," "toxic," or referred to it by the unofficial code name "burn-
ing pot handle."17 The odor varied in its intensity, tended to 
come in waves of differing durations, and affected an area of 
about 1 Y.! square miles. Physical effects attributed to the fumes 
were eye and throat irritation, headaches; and, most commonly, 
nausea. Compounds emitted by PSC included ammonia, carbon 
monoxide, formaldehyde, nitrogen oxides, and phenol, but the 
emission's downwind concentrations and toxicological impact 
were never systematically studied. IS 
In 1982 a BAAQMD inspector recorded the following com-
plainant testimony: 
I hate just having to stay inside all the time, but it's the only way 
I can stay away from it. I retired 2 years ago and ~ only live on 
Social Security. I've lived in this house 35 years and I can't af-
ford to move. I feel trapped. When I went to work, I used to 
smell it when I left, but I was going to work so I didn't call 
[BAAQMD]. Now, I don't call [BAAQMD] because I think that it is 
useless. It knocks me out. It makes me sick. My grandchildren 
are with me for the past 3 weeks. The oldest has asthma and 
allergies and I worry that it might be affecting them. 19 
A report submitted by the two area inspectors around that time 
described the situation in the following terms: 
PSC has one of the cleanest foundries in the Bay Area. Unfortu-
nately, the odor from a foundry is distinctive and PSC's odor is 
traveling two miles and more. Within four blocks of the com-
pany, the odor is present daily. In other areas downwind of . 
PSC, the odor is present intermittently, but on some days, the 
odor may become intensified, lingering for hours. The com-
plainants are universally worried about the toxicity of the 
odor .... Complainants have been inf~rmed that BAAQMD does 
not generally regulate toxiC chemicals and this fact causes addi-
tional consternation. Complainants are frustrated that they are 
17 Ibid. and BAAQMO complaint records. 
18 In 1990, in response to growing pressures from local citizens, the City of Berkeley 
required PSC to pay for a limited study, by a local consultant, of the potential health risks 
of its emissions. The study's primary conclusions were (1) "[s]ome chemical emissions 
characteristic of routine casting operations, such as ammonia, formaldehyde, nitrogen 
dioxide, and phenol, may be present at levels which can be smelled by some persons but 
pose no health risk"; (2) risks from inhalation of methylene chloride and fluorides could 
not be judged (Bendix 1990:4). The study's conclusions regarding local levels of expo-
sure were primarily based on an earlier consultant's repon to PSC. In response to that 
repon, BAAQMO's own toxicologist has stated: "The sampling conducted are [sic] inade-
quate to suppon the conclusions drawn. Three samples were taken; it is inappropriate to 
base any characterization of chronic exposure on such a limited data base," The toxicolo-
gist concluded, however: "There is no evidence to suggest that toxic emissions from PSC 
represent an imminent threat to public health (Office Memorandum regarding potential 
health risk from PSC, 24 May 1989, Attachment 0 in Repon of Air Pollution Control 
Officer "Regarding District Complaint Confirmation and Enforcement Policy Concerning 
Pacific Casting Company, 14June 1989). 
19 Inspector repon for violation notice #18680, 7/26/1982. The same repon in-
cluded additional statements by other complainants who attributed nausea, headache, 
and irritated eyes to the odor and expressed concern about its potential long-term health 
risks. 
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forced to breathe an odor whose toxicity has not been ana-
lyzed.2o 
When the dispute began, during the early 1980s, air pollu-
tion control equipment at PSC was exclusively directed at the 
capture of smoke and particulates. Gaseous emissions were un-
controlled. Despite the known odor potential of foundries such 
as PSC's and a history of scattered complaints dating to the mid-
1970s, the company was not required to install odor controls in 
the new plants it opened in 1975 and 1980. The absence of such 
controls conformed with the reactive, remedial logic of interven-
tions in this area and the relevance of established community 
sensibilities to proof of nuisance.21 The. number of odor com-
plaints against PSC increased significantly in the early 1980s, fol-
lowing the opening ·of PSC's third plant and the beginning of 
local organizational efforts.22 In 1981 a local grassroots group, 
Neighbors for Clean Air (NCA) , was formed. NCA held local 
meetings, distributed flyers, and contacted local politicians, City 
of Berkeley administrators, and newspaper reporters. In Novem-
ber of that year, NCA succeeded in confirming seven complaints 
against PSC on a single day, and the company received its first 
nuisance violation citation. In a routine inspection conducted 
shortly before that date, it Was discovered that plant No.2, which 
had opened in 1975, lacked an operating license. Plant No.3 was 
operating at the time on a "startup" basis, and it also did not have 
·a permit to operate. In view of the evident odor problems cre-
ated by the plants, a report submitted by two BAAQMD inspectors 
assigned to the area recommended against the granting of oper-
ating permits to the new plants, a move that would have forced 
the company to choose between shutting down or abating the 
odor. The company responded with the argument that "no one 
else in the industry controls the odor and no known method for 
control exists" and that a denial of a permit to plant No.3 would 
bankrupt PSC.23 The BAAQMD retroactively granted the permits to 
the company in 1982 but brought an application for abatement 
action before its hearing board. It was the first step in an almost 
10-year-Iong process. 
The hearing board held two public hearings on the matter in 
the spring of 1982. During those hearings, the board heard re-
peated, extensive, and angry testimony from. neighbors in the 
20 BAAQMD Case Summary of Pacific Steel Casting, 25 Feb. 1982. 
21 A suggestion made in 1991 by the BAAQMD Advisory Council's Public Health 
Committee that the district proactively consider potential for odor nuisances in permit-
ting decisions was rejected by the BAAQMD's director of enforcement. The director ar-
gued that because the threshold of odor tolerance varies between communities, odor 
abatement cases "warrant site-specific solutions on a case by case basis. n Minutes of 
BAAQMD Advisory Council-Public Health Committee, 3 Dec. 1991. 
22 Between May and December 1981, BAAQMD inspectors confirmed 48 com-
plaints, compared with a total of 13 confirmations in the five preceding years. 
23 BAAQMD Case Summary, Pacific Steel Casting Co., 25 Feb. 1982. 
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area. Residents testified to smelling the odor for years before 
they identified its source or heard about the air district. Some 
complained of headaches and nausea brought on by the odor, 
and many expressed concerns about the long-term health effects 
of the emissions and the safety of bearing and raising children in 
that environment.24 PSG expressed surprise at the strength of the 
opposition it was facing from its long-quiescent neighborhood. It 
blamed its problems on the environmental sensitivity and polit-
ical activism of its Berkeley milieu and offered both comparisons 
with other foundries and the previous scarcity of complaints as 
evidence that the neighbors and not its operations were to 
blame. 
Mter making a formal finding of public nuisance, the hear-
ing board instructed PSG in the spring of 1982 to formulate and 
present before it a comprehensive odor abatement plan. The pri-
mary feature of the plan the company developed after repeated 
delays and five public hearings late in fall 1983 was the elevation 
of plant No. 2's stack. The plan, which was recommended by an 
odor expert retained by PSC, was significantly cheaper than a 
scrubber solution advocated by an earlier consultant and sup-
ported by the BAAQMD'S staff. It was, however, strongly opposed 
by NCA who, in growing frustration over the slow pace of pro-
gress, hired its own attorney. 
The hearing board had similar doubts regarding the efficacy 
of the stack solution and the sincerity of PSG's efforts. It resented 
the company's repeated delays and sympathized with NCA's an-
ger. Suspecting that the stack solution would only succeed in buy-
ing more time for the foundry, the hearing board decided to 
change the incentives guiding the company's compliance 
choices. In February 1983 it issued an unconditional order of 
abatement which was to go into effect after the stack was in-
stalled. If the stack solution succeeded, the company would be in 
compliance with the terms of the order. If, on the other hand, 
the solution was ineffective, PSG could be subjected to very high 
fines and potential shutdown orders. It was the hearing board's 
ultimate weapon. 
The stack was built in March 1983, at a cost of $282,000. As 
the board suspected, it did not reduce the odors. The BAAQMD 
staff, however, strongly opposed the unconditional order. It ex-
pressed concern about the protracted litigation such an order 
would trigger and repeatedly argued for another negotiated solu-
tion. The BAAQMD legal staff refused to defend the hearing 
board's order against a suit brought by PSG, and the board had 
to retain its own legal representation. The unconditional order 
was remanded back to the hearing board, and a negotiated plan 
24 Transcripts of Public Hearing testimony before the BAAQMD hearing board, 27 
May 1982. 
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for the installation of dry scrubbers was ultimately implemented. 
The scrubbers brought some improvement, but complaints per-
sisted; in the fall of 1984 numerous violation notices were issued. 
In October 1984 the hearing board came to Berkeley for a 
hearing that lasted all day and well into the evening. Fifty area 
residents expressed their fear and outrage and recounted the in-
terferences the odors were continuing to have in their lives.25 
Later that fall, in a sharply worded document the board issued 
another unconditional abatement order, writing: 
Although it is indisputable that the elimination of this nuisance 
never would have been easy, it could have been and should 
have been accomplished long ago .... The Hearing Board has 
been told repeatedly in this case that a solution is "finally" at 
hand, only later to be told that the experts were mistaken, the 
data were incomplete, and the problem is different from what 
the Hearing Board previously was told .... The burden of this 
uncertainty has been borne by the citizen neighbors of Respon-
dent during all of this time .... The Company will now bear the 
burden of the continuing uncertainty it has created. It also will 
bear the risk of failure .... It is time for the Company to com-
ply with the law or to bear the consequences of continuing to 
. violate the law. Enough is enough.26 
Like its predecessor, this order too was opposed by the 
BAAQMD staff. NCA could not support an attorney throughout the 
litigation the order would have en~iled and, after four years, was 
eager for quick resolution. In March 1985 the BAAQMD, NCA, and 
PSC entered a consent decree agreement that centered on the 
installation of a carbon adsorption system on plant No. 2's two 
baghouses for a sum of $806,000.27 No pollution controls were 
implemented under the terms of the agreement in plants No.1 
and No.3. Although emissions from these plants were the target 
of some complaints in the early 1980s, most of NCA's member-
ship and the bulk of the complaints came from areas primarily 
affected by plant No.2. The unconditional order of abatement 
issued by the hearing board was acknowledged in the consent 
decree and remained in effect. 
By the end of 1985 the carbon adsorption unit in plant No.2 
was installed and complaints in the area diminished significantly. 
Although some improvement in air quality appeared to have 
been achieved by the consent decree, an NCA activist attributed 
the drop in complaints over the next two years primarily to ex-
haustion and a hiatus in local organizational activity. Mter five 
25 Air PoUution Control Officer v. Pacific Steel Casting Co .• Docket No. 832. Revised & 
Consolidated Order for Abatement. p. 41. 
26 Unconditional order of abatement. 13 Dec. 1984. 
27 Internal memorandum from inspections manager to Director of Enforcement 
regarding district enforcement actions to reduce and/or minimize odors from Pacific 
Steel Casting. p. 2 (1992). 
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years, NCA members were tired, financially extended, and des-
perate to believe that their efforts had borne some fruit. 28 
Regardless of whether a real improvement occurred in 1986, 
by 1987 complaints were again being filed. The situation at the 
time largely resembled the state of affairs in the early 1980s. 
NCA, despite growing recognition that the problem was not 
solved, was inactive. Many new residents to the area were not 
aware of the BAAQMD and did not know where they should com-
plain.29 Some who did complain became frustrated by the slow 
response time and critical attitude of one inspector, who on 
many occasions had defended the company and its efforts to cor-
rect the nuisance. so Mter one or two attempts at confirmation, 
many stopped calling. Between 1986 and 1988 only three nui-
sance violation days occurred. 
The number of complaints began to rise in late 1987, primar-
ily because of new organizational initiatives in Albany Village, a 
University of California family housing complex about a mile 
northeast and downwind from the plant. Albany Village was pri-
marily affected by emissions from plant No.1, which had not 
been addressed by the 1985 consent decree. Village residents 
filed some complaints with the BAAQMD in the early 1980s, but 
because of the transiency of the Village population and its isola-
tion from residents in the surrounding neighborhood, local resi-
dents had not joined in NCA's efforts during that time. When the 
Village began organizing in response to the odor in late 1988, 
local efforts were greatly aided by the neighborhood's high pop-
ulation density, efficient comrilUnication channels, and its under-
lying sense of community. 
Between November 1987 and November 1988, 200 com-
plaints were filed against PSC and 50 were confirmed. Neverthe-
less, because the rule of five was not met on anyone day during 
this period, no violation notices were issued and no abatement 
action was undertaken. Despite the hearing board's still standing 
unconditional order, the burden of proof as to the presence of a 
nuisance was, once again, the neighborhood's. In testimony 
made before the hearing board in February 1989, the BAAQMD'S 
Senior Assistant District Council offered the following interpreta-
tion of the state of the dispute: 
Now we are in a gray area. We don't have a public nuisance, but 
we are very close to a public nuisance situation. If the commu-
nity is effectively mobilized, as they were in the past, we know 
we will have a public nuisance next year. We think that they 
28 Personal interview, 21 Nov. 1990. 
29 In testimony given before the hearing board in March 1989, Berkeley 
Councilwoman Nancy Skinner testified that her office received many complaints from 
people who were unaware of what the odor was or what they might do about it. 
30 Citizen testimony in Hearing on Compliance Status Report. Docket No. 832, 2 
Feb. 1989. 
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reduced their odors substantially. However, even with that new, 
better, reduced level of odors, sensitivity changes and the com-
munity changes and that is no longer an acceptable level in the 
community.3! 
In March 1989 a regrouped Neighbors for Clean Air filed an 
injunctive relief suit against PSC. Two weeks later it was joined by 
the BAAQMD. In]une of that year, the BAAQMD, NCA, PSC, and the 
local glass mol.ders union (which intervened on behalf of the 
company) signed a second consent decree. In accordance with 
this agreement, PSC, in April 1991, 10 years after NCA first or-
ganized, installed in plant No. 1 a carbon adsorption system like 
the one installed at plant No. 2 in 1985.32 Although occasional 
complaints against PSC are still recorded by the BAAQMD, air qual-
ity in the area has, by almost all accounts, greatly improved.33 
Throughout this long dispute, the City of Berkeley remained 
largely passive. In an evaluation ofPSC's 1974 use permit request 
for plant No.2, the secretary of the Berkeley Board of Adjust-
ments stated: "Heavy industry of this type is pretty closely regu-
lated by agencies such as BAAPCD,34 and the need for conditional 
approval, if that should be the decision by the Board, may simply 
rely on other agency review."35 Plant No.3 was similarly sup-
ported by a memorandum stating that" [a] tour through plant 2 
was nearly convincing that this kind of use does not have the 
potential to cause detriment as in earlier years, especially given 
the control by BAAPCD."36 There is no indication that ,the City of 
Berkeley understood the reactive nature of the air district's poli-
cies in this area and the significance of the company's emphasis 
on dust control rather than fume control. But there is also little 
doubt that the city was extremely interested in industrial develop-
ment and union employment in an area that '~ust a few years 
ago, was blighted by wrecking yards and seemed to have no fu-
ture"37 and saw little incentive for strict regulation of the envi-
ronmental impacts of the proposed project.38 
31 BAAQMD Hearing Board Transcripts, 2 Feb. 1989. 
32 Cost for the design and construction of this unit was about $l.8 million. In addi-
tion, hoods were constructed above the molding stations in plant No.2 to direct air to the 
existing carbon adsorption system and a<ljustments were made in the plant No.3 ventila-
tion system (Chan 1992). 
33 There were 9 confirmed and 44 unconfirmed complaints in 1992, 1 confirmed 
and 13 unconfirmed complaints in 1993, and 2 confirmed and 13 unconfirmed com-
plaints for the period between 1 Jan.-15 Jun 1994. BAAQMD Enforcement Division com-
plaint records. 
34 The BMQMD was previously named Bay Area Air Pollution Control District 
(BAAPCD). 
35 Letter from Roben B. Humphrey, Secretary, to members of the Board of Adjust-
ments, 5 July 1974. 
36 Memorandum to the Berkeley Board of Adjustments, from Roben B. Humphrey, 
Secretary, 14 Nov. 1979. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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The Pacific Steel controversy was, in the context of Berkeley 
politics, part of a larger conflict over the future of heavy industry 
in the city's west side. During the 1980s, residential, retail, and 
office developments began to displace industrial land uses in the 
area and factory workers became increasingly wary of losing their 
jobs. PSC's workers perceived the complaints against the com-
pany as a threat to their livelihood and as part of a general cam-
paign against industry in the area. A PSC union president offered 
the following assessment of the community groups fighting the 
company's emissions: 
They're always outside our company, cruising around picking 
up sand and taking pictures. Then they always go. off and call 
Air Quality Control. They complain constantly .... Now they're 
complaining again, and my company is going to spend a mil-
lion and a half dollars apiece at two plants ... [b]ut that won't 
be enough for them. They'll never be satisfied .... People say 
us workers are negative, but there are 300-plus people working 
here, and all those jobs could be lost. (Scheinman 1990:29) 
NCA repeatedly emphasized that it did not want the com-
pany to shut down and expressed its belief in the existence of 
feasible technological solutions to the problem. This belief was 
shared by the hearing board, whose unconditional orders were 
designed to change the company's incentive structure and force 
it to implement advanced technological solutions rather than 
stopgap measures. Yet while the board and NCA viewed the possi-
bility of plant closure or relocation as both unlikely and unfortu-
nate, they did not preclude it as a solution of last resort. NCA 
members derived no direct benefit from PSC and saw themselves 
as uncompensated victims of its emissions. There were no cross-
cutting linkages between the company, whose employees mostly 
lived elsewhere, and the NCA members they met only as com-
plainants. In contrast to the images underpinning air pollution 
nuisance regulation, there was no single, spatially defined com-
munity. 
The long-delayed but relatively happy ending of this dispute 
offers, in retrospect, support for the hearing board's approach. 
Carbon adsorption solutions were enthusiastically supported by 
the board in an order it issued in 1984.39 Because of its cost, this 
solution was resisted for years and only incrementally imple-
mented, but it ultimately proved to be both effective and feasible. 
Under proactive best-available-technology strategies, carbon ad-
sorption or similar technological devices would have been in-
39 Regarding carbon adsorption or thermal oxidation solutions to the odor, the 
hearing board wrote: "Each of these technologies can reasonably be expected to achieve a 
control efficiency of approximately 99%. Both are very effective odor control devices, 
which, if implemented, should eliminate the cause of odor complaints in the West Berke-
ley community attributable to Pacific Steel Casting Company's operations." Air Pollution 
Control Officer v. Pacific Steel Casting Co., Docket No. 832, Revised & Consolidated Or-
der for Abatement, p. 47 (Nov. 1984). 
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eluded in the facility's pennit condition. Instead, many of the 
pollutants emitted by PSC remained uncontrolled over more 
than 10 years of local organization and complaints. For the 
neighbors who remain embroiled in the foundry dispute de-
scribed below, even such efforts may not suffice. 
VI. Foundry Odors and Nuisance Regulation: Tempe, 
Arizona " 
Capitol Castings is a scrap metal foundry located in Tempe, 
Arizona. The foundry, which produces mining machinery, 
utilizes processes similar to those employed by both PSC and 
Wells. Like its Berkeley and Skokie counterparts, Capitol Cast-
ings has been the subject of complaints against "burning rubber" 
odors attributed to the facility. As was true of PSC during the 
early 1980s, and continues to be true for Wells, pollution control 
technology in Capitol Castings is directed at the capture of par-
ticulates rather than fumes. The casting process occurs in an area 
that has a roof but essentially no walls, resulting in significant 
amounts of fugitive emissions. The company, which in 1993 em-
ployed 235 workers, is located on a stretch of unincorporated 
land surrounded by the city of Tempe. In 1952 when the plant 
was built, land around it was largely vacant. Today the factory is 
surrounded by residential neighborhoods, schools, and a large 
city park built partly as a buffer on land <;ionated by the company. 
Houses in the neighborhood are modest, rental properties are 
numerous, and residential turnover is relatively frequent. In re-
cent years, some light industry has begun to move into the area. 
Air pollution control authority is vested with the Maricopa 
County Air Pollution Control Division (MCAPCD). State law specif-
ically mentions odors among the air contaminants constituting 
air pollution, and public nuisance prohibitions are incorporated 
into the statutory definition of air pollution by reference to un-
reasonable interferences "~th the comfortable enjoyment of life 
or property of a substantial part of a community" (Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
sec. 49-471 (1993». The MCAPCD registers and claims to investi-
gate air pollution complaints but, despite its mandate under the 
statute, has been extremely reluctant to issue odor-based viola-
tion notices or to initiate enforcement action directed at odors 
per se. In contrast to the priority assigned by the BAAQMD to com-
plaint response, MCAPCD inspectors are not instructed to answer 
every complaint and are allowed a «judgment call" as to the ur-
gency of such investigations.4o 
40 Mark Meyer, Maricopa Compliance Supervisor, on repeated citizen allegations 
that their complaints met with no response, said: "Unfortunately, we don't have man-
power available to immediately respond to every complaint. But we attempt to go out and 
follow up on each group of complaints and determine technically since most complaints 
involve odors, we attempt to determine where the odor is coming from." Maricopa 
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Concerns about Capitol Castings emissions date to the early 
1970s when the first residenti<l;l development was constructed 
downwind of the facility (Yozwiak 1993). Intermittent complaints 
were registered during the 1970s and 1980s, but the MCAPCD, un-
til 1988, undertook no enforcement action. A woman who is cur-
rently active on this issue recounted some of what she has heard 
about earlier complaint attempts: 
I have been told from old residents, which are few,· that for the 
past 10 years people have tried on many occasions and have 
met dead ends and had become discouraged and disgusted 
with the whole thing. They have lost faith in their city and 
county governments in dealing with this issue. A few of those 
people would not even join us with our group, telling us "you 
are just wasting your time, we've tried it before."41 
In 1988, one local resident began what became an almost 
five-year-Iong one-man campaign against the odor. The individ-
ual, who moved into the neighborhood in 1987, became aware 
and concerned about the emissions shortly after moving in. Mter 
tracing the odor to Capitol Castings and searching for the re-
sponsible regulatory agency, he began a series of complaints to 
the MCAPCD. He received some phone calls in return but no in-
spector visits. The complaints, which related to smoke as well as 
odors, did, however, lead to the issuance of a visible emissions 
violation notice and a $300 fine. The insistent complaints to the 
MCAPCD and to Maricopa County supervisors led the Air Pollution 
Division to review Capitol Castings' compliance with applicable 
particulate and volatile organic compound (VOC) standards.42 
The MCAPCD concluded that Capitol Castings appeared to be in 
gross violation of applicable VOC standards and instructed the 
company in May 1989 to conduct a source test in order to verify 
the plant'S compliance status.43 In lieu of conducting this test, 
Capitol Castings, with MCAPCD approval, moved some of its opera-
tions from the Tempe plant to a sister facility. 
In April 1989 the local resident who had been complaining 
for the past year contacted a number of local and state elected 
officials, including Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona). Sena-
County Air Pollution Control Hearing-Capitol Castings, Inc. 10 March 1994, Reponer's 
Transcript of Proceedings, p. 15. 
41 Letter to author from Cindy Kominska, 28 April 1994. 
42 Paniculates are one of the six criteria pollutants subject to NAAQS and regulated 
by the states through their state implementation plans (SIPs) and regulations. VOCS are 
organic chemicals (also known as hydrocarbons) which, when mixed with other chemi-
cals in the air, fonn ozone. Because ozone is one of the criteria pollutants subject to 
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), VOCs as ozone precursors are regulated 
by the EPA and the states (Bryner 1993). 
43 Maricopa County Regulation III, rule 330, sec. 301, limits VOC emissions from 
core ovens to 4.86 tons per year. MCAPCD estimated in 1989 that Capitol Castings may 
have emitted as much as 186.55 tons ofVOC from its core ovens during 1988. Letter from 
Daniel W. McGovern, regional administrator, to U.S. Sen. Dennis DeConcini, 28 Sept. 
1989. 
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tor DeConcini forwarded the letter to the EPA, which identified 
Capitol Castings, because of its. VOC emissions, as a significant 
violator.44 Subsequent monitoring conducted by the MCAPCD be-
tween March 1990 and March 1991 showed high levels of total 
suspended particulates (TSP) at the plant's vicinity, although the 
extent to which Capitol Castings was responsible for the TSP 
emissions could not be determined.45 The MCAPCD was, however, 
prompted by this finding to reevaluate the terms of Capitol Cast-
ings' permit. Negotiations over the terms of this permit and 
proper estimates of the plant'S emissions stretched for almost two 
years during which the company continued to operate under an 
expired permit.46 
Until 1993, little or no collective neighborhood activity oc~ 
curred. Intermittent complaints were filed with the MCAPCD as a 
result of individual discovery and initiative, but complainants 
were not aware of each other and no concerted action occurred. 
In the winter of 1993 during a parent-teacher organization meet-
ing at the neighborhood school, one mother raised her ,concerns 
about the fumes she had repeatedly noticed in the grounds and 
sometimes in the classrooms. Other parents who had long had 
similar worries agreed, and some who knew the local air quality 
activist urged the PTO to connect with him. Soon afterward a 
local grassroots group, Clean Air Now (CAN), was formed. In 
March 1993 CAN held a public meeting at the school that was 
attended by about 100 residents.47 Many of those present spoke 
of years of concern about emissions they associated with head-
aches and nausea. Others mentioned respiratory ailments and 
fears about latent carcinogenic effects. The principal of the 
school questioned whether Capitol Castings emission were re-
sponsible for the fact that 25% of her students suffered from 
asthma and allergies.48 The meeting and the group's other ef-
forts resulted in television and newspaper reports about the dis-
pute. 
44 Letter from Virginia Turner to local citizen, Special Assistant, Office of u.s. Sen. 
Dennis DeConcini, 20 June 1989. 
45 Letter from Daniel W. McGovern, EPA region IX regional administrator, to U.S. 
Sen. DeConcini, 3 April 1992. ' 
46 Letter from Mark Mayer, Air Quality Engineer II-MCBAPC, to Jill Schlesiger, Of-
fice of U.S. Sen. John McCain, 25Jan. 1994. 
47 The meeting was advertised by distributing leaflets door to door. The leaflet in-
formed residents of the MCAPCD's phone number and asked them to relate their story to 
a local newspaper reporter. It concluded with the motto, "Your presence is a must-The 
voice of one is weak, the voice of many is strong!" 
48 The principal repeated this claim in a formal letter to the MCAPCD hearing 
board inJune 1993. The letter states: "Since becoming principal at Aguilar School nine 
years ago, I have experienced noticeable heavy fumes in the air on our school campus 
during school hours .... Since twenty-five per cent of our student population suffers from 
asthma and allergies, it is my concern (as well as that of our school nurse) as to how these 
fumes are affecting our students." Letter from Loretta B. Pacheco, Principal, Aguilar 
School to Hearing Board, Maricopa County Air Pollution Control Office, 3 June 1993. 
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Capitol Castings, like PSC, reacted with surprise to the con-
troversy. In newspaper inteIViews in March 1993, the plant's se-
nior engineer stated: "we don't have the foggiest idea what the 
odor is" (Yozwiak 1993), and "We don't think the odors come 
from this facility. We've investigated the facility on a number of 
occasions. We don't know where its [sic] coming from" (Hoye 
1993). In April 1993 the MCAPCD itself was still unwilling to iden-
tify Capitol Castings as the culprit in the odor and issued the 
following response to a CAN member's inquiry: "The Division 
has received numerous odor complaints from the area and is 
continuing to investigate the source. A one-mile survey of the in-
dustrial community is being conducted to assist in identifying any 
possible source of odor."49 
CAN's activities did, however, seem to revive the long-stalled 
permit proceedings and Capitol Castings was directed, in March 
1993, to submit a permit application. The application was for-
mally denied on 30 April 1993, and the MCAPCD issued an order 
of abatement against the company that was stayed by the 
MCAPCD'S hearing board. The matter finally came for a hearing 
before the board on 4June 1993. 
The June 1993 public meeting climaxed months of organiza-
tional efforts on both sides of the dispute. CAN presented a peti-
tion signed by 266 of Capitol Castings neighbors and scores of 
angry letters detailing symptoms and concerns associated with 
the odors. 50 A woman who had lived in the area sihce 1972 testi-
fied: "Walk out the back door and you cough, cough and you 
have to go back in the house. "51 Others expressed severe distrust 
of the air division and the company. Capitol Castings responded 
with an organizational campaign of its own.52 It presented many 
letters in which its employees recounted their dependence on 
and loyalty to the company. In one such letter an employee 
wrote: 
I can not begin to tell you what my career and my job at Capitol 
Castings means to me and my wife. As you know, today's econ-
omy is not what it use to be and jobs are not easy to come by. 
Three years ago I began the nightmare of job searching ... 
then I was hired at Capitol Castings in 1992. In September of 
49 Letter from B. J. Atwood, Enforcement Manager, to Cindy Kominska, 16 April 
1993. 
50 The letters were specifically solicited by CAN, which also circulated during that 
time a questionnaire in which it inquired about residents' health problems and concerns. 
51 Maricopa County Air Pollution Control Hearings-Capitol Castings, Inc., 4June 
1993, Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, p. 148. 
52 On 1 June 1993 Capitol Castings distributed among its employees a request ask-
ing them to submit letters detailing their concerns to the MCAPCD hearing board. The 
letter included a fact sheet produced by the company and a list of points employees might 
want to make in their letter. Letter from Charles P. Stanford, Jr., V.P. & General Manager, 
Chandler Grinding Media Division, addressed to ~'Dear Valued Employee," 1 June 1993. 
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1992 I got married. Together the three of us have a good life 
together and only dream of more.53 
A sales administration supervisor in Capitol Castings offered 
the following assessment of his company's predicament: "We pro-
duce wear-resistant steel castings for the mining industry. Our 
market is very sensitive to price and our competition is fierce."54 
Additional letters and presentations were offered by union repre-
sentatives, business associates, suppliers of the company, and the 
Arizona Association of Industries. 
The hearing board granted Capitol Castings a one-year con-
ditional permit on 21 June 1993. The permit allowed Capitol to 
operate without mcyor restrictions but required extensive testing 
to quantify the emissions and reduction of any excess emissions 
identified through the testing. In addition, Capitol Castings was 
instructed to' retain an odor expert and "submit a report to the 
Division on the measures it proposes to take to reduce any odors 
from its facility, identified as a source of complaints."55 Testing 
conducted under the conditional permit was to be. directed at 
the' resolution qf the long-standing dispute regarding the com-
pany's complianc~ with limits on particulates and VOC emis-
sions. In' addition, the company was, required to produce esti-
mates of its emission of a' long list of suspected hazardous 
pollutants. The company retained the same odor expert who 
consulted for PSC in the Berkeley case. The expert who testified 
before the hearing board detected "phenol fOhnaldehyde com-
ing from Capitol Castings" but noted the presence of multiple 
other odor sources in the area.56 A first report issued by the odor 
consultant in August 1993 suggested that a change in the binders 
used by Capitol Castings might be sufficient to reduce odor com-
plaints. The report asserted that carbon adsorption solutions, be-
cause of the hot Arizona climate, would be difficult to implement 
iri this case. Thermal incineration was recognized as an effective 
solution, but the report pointed to drawbacks associated with its 
~hoo~M , 
In March 1994 the hearing board held another public hear-
ing iri connection with the case. Capitol Castings reported that in 
accordance with the odor expert'~ suggestions, it had switched to 
a different binder and announced that it would install fans di-
rected at diffusing and slowing the rate of' emissions. Capitol 
Castings also relayed its consultant's assessment that the odor did 
, 53 Employee letter to the MCAPCD 'Hearing Board, 10 June 1993. 
54 Letter to MCAPCD Hearing Board, 2June 1993. 
55 Conditional Permit, appendix A, Issued to Capitol Castings, Inc., Tempe Foundry 
Division, 21 June 1993. 
56 Reponer's transcript of Public Hearing on 4June 1993, pp. 80, 81. 
57 Odo~ Science and Engineering, Repon to Capitol Castings, Inc., on Odor Investi-
gation at Capitol Castings' Tempe Facility. OS&E Project No. 0322-1-01, 16 Aug. 1993, p. 
3-1. ' 
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not constitute a health risk. When CAN members disputed the 
basis for this finding, the MCAPCD compliance supervisor candidly 
acknowledged the limited protections offered by the district's 
regulations with the statement, "if we say these emission levels are 
acceptable, we are talking about acceptable within our regula-
tions. We don't have something that says that this is the health 
base level or this is how much concentration is considered help-
ful or not. It is a numerical emission limitation for 'some kind of 
work practice standard." An attorney for the MCAPCD concurred, 
adding that "right now there is no numerical limit which can be 
enforced for many hazardous air pollutants."58 
Only five representatives from CAN were present at the 
March 1994 meeting, and their testimony revealed growing diffi-
culties in the group's organizational momentum. Central mem-
bers, including the person who began the process in 1988, had 
moved out of the neighborhood.59 Those left behind were feel-
ing increasingly demoralized. A woman who was central to CAN's 
activities duiing the previous year offered the following descrip-
tion of her diminishing resolve: 
I along with my fellow neighbors, have spent much more than 
enough time to play this game of charade during this entire 
permit process. Just waiting to see how long we can hang in 
. there. We have called and called complaining to Capitol Cast-
ings and/or the County only to receive either no response .. . 
to I don't smell anything or it can't be coming from us .... I 
have not called every time I have encountered the fumes, 
frankly, I am not going to take away that time from my family 
any longer. If it is convenient for me to call I'll call, I don't see 
any more official complaining making any difference.6o 
The fans were tested and discarded during the summer of 1994, 
and Capitol Castings undertook additional odor control experi-
ments. A new permit application is still pending, and negotia-
tions continue over the level of VOCs emitted by the company 
and appropriate measures for their control. The MCAPCD has be-
come increasingly aggressive in its approach to the problem and, 
if nonnuisance-related regulatory violations can be documented, 
may well insist on comprehensive abatement action. Neverthe-
less, the agency remains unwilling to implement its reactive odor 
control mandate. Throughout the summer of 1994 local resi-
dents have continued to complain. 
58 Maricopa County Air Pollution Control Hearing-Capitol Castings, Inc., 10 
March 1994, Reponer's Transcript of Proceedings,pp. 58, 60. 
59 In interviews, those who moved out of the neighborhood during the past year 
said that the emissions were a contributing but not the sole reason for their decision. 
60 Written comments prepared in advance of the 4 June hearing. Oral testimony 
actually delivered by that person during the hearing followed' the general gist of the 
quoted statement. . 
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VII. Discussion 
Although the Wells, Capitol Castings, and Pacific Steel dis-
putes were virtually concurrent, nont:: of the three neighborhood 
antipollution groups was aware of the others' efforts. Nor is there 
any evidence of communication among the three agencies over-
seeing these cases. Although the same industrial process and 
odorous emissions were at the center of all three disputes, in ac-
cordance with the fundamental precepts of reactive regulation 
each case was evaluated as a unique and distinct controversy. For 
each foundry, complainants and agencies needed to establish 
that emissions from specific facilities violated reasonableness 
standards within each relevant community. Across the United 
States there are thousands of foundries like the three described 
here (Foundry Management & Technology 1992). Where local 
populations are affected by the fumes emitted by these plants, 
each neighborhood must make its own case for intervention. 
Under the proactive regulatory model rejected by the EPA, 
pollutants of this sort would be uniformly controlled through 
technology or emission standards. Instead, potentially toxic, un-
controlled foundry fumes remain subjec;:t to reactive structures 
under rationales of diversity in local environmental choice. 
Deference to local choice does not, in and of itself, preclude 
the possibility that most or all foundry neighbors would opt for 
cleaner air. But the economic benefits implicit to reactive struc-
tures are incompatible with conditions of frequent, successful 
mobilization. In a hypothetical world where most communities 
demanded and achieved a similarly high standard of abatement, 
aggregate pollution control costs (including the costs of uncer-
tainty, expensive retrofitting, complaint handling, and litigation) 
are likely to be higher than those associated with uniform proac-
tive standards. ' 
While this study does not address the likelihood of local pro-
test against foundry fumes, the history of the disputes suggests 
that the voicing of claims is only the. first step in a long and un-
certain quest for pollution remedies. All three foundry disputes 
were the result of persistent and unambiguous complaints 
against local environmental conditions. In all three cases, pollu-
tion abatement was averted or delayed through judicial or regula-
tory formulations of relevant thresholds and norms. While judi-
cial responses in the Berkeley and Skokie disputes specifically 
articulated these norms and the distributions they justified, the 
regulatory policies of the BAAQMD and MCAPCD seemed intent on 
avoiding such moments of explicit allocation. 
The legitimacy of courts, like that of all triadic conflict resolu-
tion structures, depends on their ability to bridge coercion with 
consent (Shapiro 1981). In the context of air pollution nuisance 
adjudication, this resolution has been pursued through a priori 
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assumptions of consent to local environmental conditions and 
distinctions between prevailing values and the sensitivities under-
pinning rejected claims. Judicial decisions in the Well5 and PSC 
cases followed along this line when they invoked the nature of 
the locale, the mildness of the odor, and the negative impact of 
organization on the authenticity of claims. 
Unlike courts, agencies can often deflect and avoid hard 
choices, and it is toward this goal that reactive odor enforcement 
policies appear to be largely directed. Without engaging in direct 
balancing between the interests of neighbors and industry, 
BAAQMD policies dismiss most odor complaints as insufficient in-
dicators of local community standards. These standards are de-
fined by the BAAQMD through evidentiary requirements of five 
complaint confirmations in a day or the detection of an odor 
following a fourfold dilution of an air sample. Complainants who 
fail to meet these conditions are left, much like losing nuisance 
plaintiffs in court, with the message that they had failed to estab-
lish a valid claim. But unlike the finality of the loss that judges 
impose, reactive air pollution administration rarely forecloses the 
possibility of future relief. This remains true even though, as in 
Tempe, the agency has been extremely reluctant to undertake 
comprehensive anti-odor measures. 
As indicated by the activist stance of the BAAQMD hearing 
board and the Illinois Pollution Control Board, reactive air pollu-
tion control institutions are not always unsympathetic to the com-
plaints of citizens. Nor, as the ultimate resolution in the PSC case 
demonstrates, are all demands for odor pollution abatement 
doomed to fail. Occasional reactive interventions accord with the 
logic of community and environmental diversity and are proba-
bly crucial to the legitimacy of such structures. It is only when 
such interventions become routine that the link between reactive 
environmental law and the status quo is severed and the eco-
nomic logic of such structures disappears. There is little in the 
stories told here to suggest the likelihood of such a transforma-
tion even under conditions of persistent challenge to ostensibly 
rebuttable presumptions of q>mmunity tolerance. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The relationship between community choice and locai envi-
ronmental conditions has increasingly become an object of both 
political controversy and academic attention. Two related devel-
opments are at the center of these debates. The first is the out-
rage expressed by poor and minority communities against the 
disproportionate environmental burdens industrial facilities im-
pose on their locale (United Church of Christ Commission for 
Racial Justice 1987; Bullard 1990; Mohai & Bryant 1992; Cole 
1992); the second is the gridlock created by local opposition to 
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the siting of a growing spectrum of locally unwanted land uses 
(Popper 1991; Mazmanian & Morell 1990; Brion 1991). In com-
bination, the two phenomena have challenged longstanding pre-
sumptions of differences in local environmental preferences and 
pri<?rities <:!.nd haye suggested the inadequacy of tegulatC!ry mod-
els premised on the presence of such diversities. 
The regulatio~ of air pollution under reactive nuisancestruc-
~ures is a prime example of the place of voluntary diversity sup-
positions in preserite.nvironmental policies. The difficulties 
courts and agencies have encountered in the implementation of 
these structures illuminates fundamental contradictions in the 
basic commitments of reactive ~llocative institutions. While it is 
the theoretical possibility of complaints and the formal availabil-
ityof complaint channels that grounds the legitimacy of su~h re-
active systems, it is the expectation that complaints will rarely ma-
terialize that anchors their rationale. Reactive nuisance enforce-
ment, like all conflict resolution models of regulation, is foq.nded 
on the anticipation that complaints will be exceptional occur-
rences 'within a normally harmonious coexistence between indus-
trial, municipal, and residential neighbors. When these expecta-
tions are frustrated and variations in pollution tolerance do not 
materialize, allocation mechanisms. that depend on such dif-
ferentiations can function only through formal constructions of 
local choice. In the context of air pollution nuisance adjudica-
tion and regulation, these constructions have been grounded in 
manufactured conceptions of communities harboring shared val~ 
ues regarding environmental trade-offs and priorities. While qui-
escence within such communities was invariably interpreted as 
consent, protest wOllld at best become an occasion for explicit 
balancing of the interests involved.. . 
Both the environmental justice movement and the NIMBY syn-
drome have drastically challenged presumptions of chosen envi-
ronmental diversity and highlighted problems of both equity and 
efficiency in current systems of environmental burden distribu-
tion. With groWing convergence in the environmental priorities 
articulated by groups in all social strata, once-hidden utilitarian 
allocations are increasingly uncovered. Because such explicit al-
locations conflict with commitments to the well-being of all indi-
viduals, they cap' undermine bonds of social commitment and ex-
pose moral contradictions (Calabresi & Bobbit 1978). Formal 
deference to local initiative and the legal neutrality of reactive 
structures long diffused these tensions by relieving governmental 
institutions of responsibility for distributional outcomes. The cur-
rent crisis in environmental burden allocation suggests a growing 
need to confront personal and. <;ollective costs long hidden 
through constructions of community choice. 
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